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Since 1981, risk assessment has formed the
methodological basis for much public poli-
cy related to the regulation ofoccupational
and environmental chemicals in the United
States. The adoption of risk assessment as
a policy instrument to identify and quanti-
fy risks of cancer associated with chemical
exposure was largely due to public concern
about the potential contribution ofchemi-
cal exposures to cancer (1) and political
frustration with delays in action by the
EPA and the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA). In addi-
tion, pressures from industry (often exerted
through litigation) required EPA and
OSHA to provide a scientific rationale for
specific regulatory decisions (2).
There have been many scientific cri-
tiques of risk assessment, in theory and in
practice. Here I consider the pragmatic
value of risk assessment as a method for
reaching public policy decisions from the
perspective of an environmentalist. My
criteria are primarily operational, rather
than theoretical: What has been the con-
tribution of risk assessment, in practice, to
the efficiency, adequacy, clarity, enforce-
ability, and public acceptability of govern-
ment regulation since 1981?
Early History ofRisk Assessment. In
1979, an interagency committee of the
U.S. government proposed guidelines for
identifying and assessing chemical carcino-
gens [see Identifjying and Regulating Car-
cinogens (3) for a history ofcarcinogen pol-
icy in the United States]. These guidelines
have been the source ofsubsequent science
policy for occupational and environmental
regulation since that time. Before 1979,
regulation of toxic chemicals had generally
been based on one ofthree principles: tech-
nology-based control, risk-benefit balanc-
ing, or banning. The technological basis
for regulation was predicated on the avail-
ability of control technology (4) or on the
limits of analytical chemistry (5). How-
ever, policy based on these concepts is
inherently unsatisfactory because it limits
risk reduction to those actions achievable
through currently available technology
(although specific statutory language can
and has been used to elicit advances in
technology). Further actions may be pre-
cluded in those cases where high levels of
pollution remain even after maximally
achievable controls are imposed or where
analytical chemistry is not sensitive enough
to measure contamination at the point of
release. This latter concern is particularly
relevant to regulating persistent, bioaccu-
mulated chemicals discharged into surface
waters because measurement at the point
of discharge may not adequately prevent
long-term accumulation, as in the case of
organochlorine contamination ofthe Great
Lakes (6).
The risk-benefit balancing approach to
regulation, embodied in the U.S. statutes
regulating pesticides, incorporates an
assumption that such a balance can be
found (2,7). In other words, the balance
assumes that there are levels of exposure
where risks are very low or nonexistent
such that the net benefits ofcontinued use
are clear. In the early 1970s it was general-
ly assumed that some pesticides were non-
toxic to nontarget species at some dose,
either because of the nature of their toxic
effects ("threshold effects") or because of
qualitative differences in species response
("selective toxicity") (8).
The third approach, banning, was
included by Congress in those statutes that
empowered or obligated regulators to use
the option to ban production or use of a
chemical entirely, based solely on finding it
was hazardous (2). The Delaney amend-
ments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act, sections ofthe Clean Air Act, and the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Roden-
ticide Act permitted agencies to prohibit
releases and uses ofsubstances identified as
carcinogens without the need to calculate
the extentofthe hazard, which is the func-
tion ofrisk assessment.
Risk Assessment through the 1980s.
The convergence ofnew statutes, new pub-
lic health concerns, and new developments
in science caused many environmentalists
and others to reconsider the appropriate-
ness of these approaches to regulating all
types of toxic chemicals (9). The new
statutes, such as the Toxic Substances
Control Act, required more explicit risk
balancing. New initiatives by EPA and
OSHA to regulate a broader range of
industrial chemicals provoked strong
response from the regulated community.
Scientific developments suggested that
rapid test methods geared toward identify-
ing mutagenic properties of chemicals
could be useful in speeding up regulatory
review. Public concern about cancer was
heightened by President Nixon's declara-
tion of a "war on cancer" in 1971, which
coincided with the creation of EPA and
OSHA. One element ofthe war on cancer
was disease prevention. After considerable
controversy, the public health community
had succeeded in translating the scientific
consensus on the carcinogenic effects of
cigarette smoking (10) into public policy.
The search for other opportunities to pre-
vent cancer by controlling identifiable
chemical etiologies was advanced by the
development ofsimple assays for mutagen-
esis, which was thought to be a characteris-
tic property ofchemical carcinogens.
Prevention, as part of public health
policy, assumes the obligation to act before
the induction of disease or death. To
completely prevent chemical-induced dis-
ease, it is necessary to act before informa-
tion on human response is complete. The
1979 proposals on risk assessment, restated
several times in the 1980s, were premised
on the following principles: chemical
exposures are a significant contribution to
the overall incidence of human cancer;
chemical-induced cancers can be prevent-
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ed by identifying potential human carcino-
gens before human exposure on such a
scale that epidemiological studies can
demonstrate plausible associations between
exposure and disease; and the evaluation of
potential carcinogens should be quantita-
tive as well as qualitative in order to ensure
that regulations meet the criteria of the
risk-balancing statutes (3).
Debate continues over the quantitative
contribution of chemical exposures to
human cancer (10-13). It is unlikely that
epidemiological studies can completely
resolve this issue, given problems in expo-
sure assessment and the likelihood ofcom-
plex interactions among chemical expo-
sures, genetics, and lifestyle factors (in-
cluding smoking and diet).
Methods for identifying carcinogenic
chemicals have been applied for more than
a decade, using animal models, structure-
activity analyses, and short-term in vitro
tests (13,14). But as data were acquired
from these procedures, regulatory agencies
needed criteria to judge the results ofthese
tests and assays, examples ofwhich can be
found in the decision rules of the U.S.
National Toxicology Program (NTP) and
the International Agency for Research on
Cancer (14). Moreover, for regulatory
purposes, qualitative methods were insuffi-
cient to support regulation, particularly
after the U.S. Supreme Court struck down
OSHA's benzene standard in 1980 because
of the insufficiency of a science-based
rationale for risk assessment and reduction.
From 1979 to 1987, U.S. regulatory
agencies developed more specific principles
on which to base quantitative risk assess-
ment for chemical carcinogens and other
agents. These principles were bounded by
several important policy decisions that
were generally accepted, although not
without controversy: First, risk assessment
was to proceed in the absence of data on
human response, relying when necessary
on results from experimental research; sec-
ond, agencies were to provide quantitative
estimates ofdose at a level ofrisk that was
deemed to be politically acceptable; and
third, risk assessments were to be presump-
tively conservative, that is, protective of
human health in the case of uncertainty.
These are policy decisions that have largely
shaped the continuing debate over risk
assessment in the United States (15-1/).
Acceptability ofRisk Assessment in
Theory and Practice. Although risk
assessment has been central to U.S. policy
making since 1980, the environmental
community remains divided on its accept-
ability as a policy tool. For some, the mere
use of risk assessment is an admission that
a certain amount of risk is acceptable; to
these and other advocates, the imposition
of any risk is unlawful under certain
statutes (such as the original Clean Air Act
and the Delaney Clause) and unethical in
most circumstances (16,17). This is a
powerful argument, and the American tra-
dition of rejecting unequal treatment
under the law challenges the allocation of
individual risks in a way that inevitably
affects some person(s) more than others
(and others not at all, given the strict inter-
pretation ofrisk assessment as a probability
estimate). When a pattern appears to
occur in which risks are often borne by one
group whose members generally have less
access to economic and political power,
broad issues ofcivil rights have been raised
by the environmental justice movement
(18).
Other environmentalists have support-
ed the appropriate use of risk assessment
because of its potential to increase the
speed and resource conservation ofgovern-
ment response in preventing disease.
These environmentalists have generally
supported a strict interpretation of risk
assessment guidelines at the level ofhazard
identification (that is, the criteria that sup-
port the designation of a chemical as car-
cinogenic in humans based on animal
data) and have resisted modifications in
the methods of dose-response calculation
and dose-exposure extrapolation (19).
These proponents have argued for continu-
ing the qualitative assumption that animal
carcinogens, under any circumstance of
dosing including the maximally tolerated
dose, are probably human carcinogens.
The most controversial provisions of
current methods ofquantitative risk assess-
ment are the default assumptions for quan-
tifying exposure and risk at very low levels,
in the range generally considered accept-
able by policymakers (that is, between
1:100,000 and 1:1,000,000). The major
default assumption is based on a single-hit
theory of genotoxicity as the basis for the
linearized multistage model of carcinogen-
esis, which provides the rationale for the
statistical approaches used to derive unit
risk estimates from experimental dose-
response data (14). Because policy deci-
sions require estimation of dose beyond
the range offeasibly obtainable experimen-
tal or human data, inference rules must be
used to extrapolate to the range ofconcern.
Since 1980 EPA has relied on the assump-
tion that chemical carcinogens at small
doses nevertheless increase the probability
of cancer by some amount greater than
zero, and that in the low-dose range, incre-
ments of dose are associated with propor-
tional increases in risk (3,9). This assump-
tion, being generic, does not necessarily
reflect chemical-specific mechanisms of
action.
The default assumptions and the rules
that cover low-dose extrapolation have
been defended on the grounds that they
provide conservative buffers for uncertain-
ty and possible variations in sensitivity
within the human population (11,14,
19,20). Critics, particularly those who
favor less stringent or less frequent regula-
tion, have objected to the bias toward con-
servatism in risk assessments (21,22); how-
ever, as pointed out by Finkel (23), it is
not clear that these biases always result in
gross overestimates ofrisk (20,24). Others
have challenged the relevance of animal
data for particular types of carcinogens on
the basis ofpurported species differences in
metabolism, target tissue response, or
inherent sensitivity differences among
species (25-2/. In particular, some critics
have argued that physiologically based
pharmacokinetic information should be
considered in the process of developing
risk assessments in extrapolating from test
species to predicted human exposures and
adverse effects (13,28). However, the
acquisition of agent-specific pharmacoki-
netic information adds greatly to the bur-
den of gathering data for regulatory pur-
poses. There is likely to be considerable
variation within the human population
with respect to pharmacokinetics, depend-
ing on genetics, age, and diet, as well as
possible pharmacokinetic interactions
among toxic chemicals and other sub-
stances, so that improving the precision of
our knowledge of inbred rodents may not
improve the predictability of risk assess-
ments for public health purposes. The
expansion of the time and resources need-
ed to carry out risk assessments may be sci-
entifically attractive, but it has major
impacts on the allocation of resources in
government and the private sector (29),
and, as argued by Lave et al. (30), it may
not be cost effective as an investment for
decision making.
Over the past 10 years, these objections
have been raised in the context of propos-
als to regulate specific chemicals such as
methylene chloride, formaldehyde, per-
chloroethylene, and the dioxins. In no
instance have the critics presented com-
pelling scientific evidence to justify alterna-
tive approaches to risk assessment, except
for the generic call for "more (or better)
science." A recent consideration ofone of
the most controversial issues in risk assess-
ment, the use of the maximally tolerated
dose in carcinogen bioassay tests, could not
be resolved by a panel of experts recently
convened by the National Research Council
(31).
In principle it is unreasonable to object
to the admission of "more (or better) sci-
ence" in risk assessment. Relevant data on
specific chemicals may be very useful in
judging the applicability of the general
default rules, as well as in more precisely
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estimating risk using the linearized multi-
stage model. The problem is that we do
not really knowwhat these data are or how
we would incorporate them into alternative
methods of risk assessment. Some critics
ofrisk assessment disagree with the process
of hazard identification, and they do not
accept the NTP bioassay as a reliable
method ofidentifying carcinogens (26,27).
It is not always recognized that risk assess-
ment is primarily a policy tool (20,29) and
not the optimal method oftesting scientif-
ic hypotheses. Public health policy and
clinical medicine have similar relationships
to basic science: both are practical disci-
plines that demand, at some point, action
even in the face ofresidual uncertainties.
Costs and Benefits ofRisk Assess-
ment. Has the use of risk assessment
improved policy making, in terms of effi-
ciency (use ofgovernment and nongovern-
ment resources), speed, and public accept-
ability? The record over the past decade
does not support a positive answer, al-
though it is difficult to distinguish prob-
lems in the process from those of political
interference (15,32). Despite the confi-
dence of some that risk assessment could
be insulated from the political and eco-
nomic parts of policy making (9,33), it is
in practice usually impossible to separate
risk assessment and risk management from
each other (15).
It would be difficult to claim from the
record that the U.S. process ofpolicy mak-
ing with regard to regulating chemicals is
efficient in terms of resource demands or
expeditious in terms of time to closure.
One problem with the adoption of risk
assessment as a policy tool is the difficulty
in terminating data accumulation, even
temporarily. Even ifresearch continues, it
is unlikely to reach incontrovertible uncer-
tainty. Risk assessment per se provides no
guidance as to how much information is
sufficient for decision making (2). For
most ofthe chemicals ofpublic concern in
the 1980s (lead, dioxin, formaldehyde, eth-
ylene dibromide, benzene), no final regula-
tory action has resulted even after years of
arguments over data and data analysis.
Risk assessment can encourage the use
of research as a delaying tactic, given the
high stakes ofmost regulatory action in the
United States. Because it is impossible for
EPA to issue interim rules for a particular
chemical, each step in the process has
increasingly higher stakes for all parties
concerned. The history of EPA's dealings
with the dioxins is illustrative (6). By the
end of the 1970s, EPA had concluded its
first evaluation ofthe health and ecological
hazards of 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-
dioxin (TCDD) in connection with regu-
lations under the Clean Water Act. How-
ever, in 1981, after intervention by the
Dow Chemical Company, no regulations
were issued. In 1983, the second wave of
environmental controversies over dioxin
erupted, with the discovery of contamina-
tion in communities in Missouri, Illinois,
and New York. The strong provisions of
the hazardous waste cleanup statute, CERCLA
or Superfund, required EPA to take action
at these sites, but it did not mandate a
standard for cleanup in this case or else-
where. The agency's hand was forced by
the Centers for Disease Control, whose sci-
entists used risk assessment principles to
calculate public health guidance for evacu-
ation of contaminated communities in
Missouri.
EPA reopened its risk assessment for
the dioxins shortly afterward, and in 1986
the first health assessment document for
TCDD was published. Using standard
methods of quantitative risk assessment,
the EPA proposed a very low unit risk for
lifetime exposure to TCDD, 0.016 fg/
kg/day (a unit risk is the lifetime daily dose
associated with an increase in cancer risk of
1:1,000,000). This risk assessment raised
political controversies as more and more
dioxin-contaminated sites were discovered.
In addition, it was found that municipal
waste incinerators could be sources ofdiox-
ins from the incomplete combustion of
certain precursor materials in the presence
of halogens (34). The Environmental
Defense Fund (EDF) petitioned and later
sued the EPA under the Toxic Substances
Control Act to regulate the ongoing releas-
es ofdioxins and related compounds from
a range ofsources, including chemical pro-
duction, industrial waste disposal, and
solid waste incineration. An important
part of EDF's petition was the novel pro-
posal to treat the dioxins (and furans) as a
class ofsimilarly toxic chemicals, based on
structural fit to the dioxin or Ah receptor.
This proposal has now been adopted by
EPA and many national regulatory agen-
cies in the toxic equivalency factorapproach
(6).
The recognition that municipal incin-
erators were important sources of dioxins
was politically controversial, and regulation
was delayed as EPA undertook another risk
assessment in 1988. EPA's first proposal
was to average the risk estimates produced
by its scientists, those at CDC, and at
other national agencies, but objections to
this method encouraged EPA to adopt a
more science-based approach (6,35). The
conclusions of that review were basically a
restatement ofthe 1986 risk assessment.
However, a new political obstacle to
regulating dioxins arose with the revelation
from EPA's National Dioxin Survey that
pulp and paper mills could also generate
substantial amounts of dioxins and furans
through the use of chlorine bleaching.
The paper industry, facing strict controls
on its discharges and waste disposal prac-
tices (including bans on burning and land
farming of solid wastes), forced EPA into
reconsidering the TCDD risk assessment.
The third risk assessment is ongoing at
EPA (as ofApril 1993). Enormous pres-
sure has been brought on regulators and
scientists involved in reassessment (6).
The chlorine industry contributed funds
for convening a scientific meeting at the
world-renowned Banbury Center in Oc-
tober 1990; a public relations firm retained
by the industry then disseminated mislead-
ing information on the nature and conclu-
sions ofthis meeting (6).
This process ofassessment and reassess-
ment has not encouraged public confi-
dence in risk assessment (16,17). More-
over, the highly sophisticated use of risk
assessment methodologies by the waste
management industry, seeking permits to
site incinerators and landfills, has increased
public suspicion of the validity of the
numbers because ofthe apparent ease with
which consulting risk assessors can produce
large numbers ofdocuments purporting to
estimate the precise risks ofsuch facilities.
Public suspicion of risk assessment has
been attributed to public ignorance of the
nature of risk and the technical steps of
risk assessment (22,36,37). Ifignorance is
the source of the public's reaction, then it
is important to consider how, and whether,
it can be overcome. A decision-making
process that is inaccessible to public under-
standing is contrary to the principles of
American government (33). On the other
hand, the public may not be ignorant but
rather cannily skeptical of a method that
does not seem able to generate stable esti-
mates of risk. Unless the method can be
greatly im-proved and a broader consensus
generated as to its acceptability and its sci-
entific validity, it will not be possible to
persuade the public to believe in some-
thing that industry, environmentalists, and
academic scientists periodically attack in
both theory and practice.
Alternatives to RiskAssessment. Risk
assessment, as noted above, arose from sci-
entific advances in the identification of
chemical carcinogens, pressure on agencies
to specify risks more precisely and with
more documentation, and the desire ofthe
public for more regulation of toxic chemi-
cals. However, the practical use of risk
assessment in public policy does not seem
to have answered these needs. Risk esti-
mates may appear to be more precise than
general statements of hazard, but few
groups (industry, regulators, scientists, or
the public) have faith in their precision.
Scientific advances in our knowledge of
carcinogenesis make the process more
complicated and open up more possible
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models to guide low-dose and species-to-
species extrapolation (31). The last decade
has seen fewer regulations, rather than
more, compared with the 1970s.
There are alternatives to risk assess-
ment. First, we could return to the tech-
nology-based approach or we could extend
the obligation to ban. Both of these
approaches, as discussed above, are based
on the qualitative finding of risk (hazard
identification), which triggers either the
application of best available control tech-
nology or an outright ban or restriction on
use. Commoner (16) has argued that only
bans have significantly reduced environ-
mental risks, citing the consequences of
EPA actions to ban DDT and polychlori-
nated biphenyls and the success in lower-
ing human lead exposure in the United
States after drastic reductions in the allow-
able levels of lead in gasoline. Inter-
national agreements to ban the production
and use of ozone-depleting chemicals are
more recent examples of this approach
(38), as is the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development experiment
in multinational approaches to risk reduc-
tion for "sunset" chemicals, whose risks are
considered sufficiently great that no quan-
titative calculation of risk is necessary to
justify concerted action.
Second, we could adopt simpler rules
to estimate risk. The European approach,
applying a safety or uncertainty factor to
all types of toxicants, avoids the need to
select mechanism-based approaches to
classes of toxicants based on an endpoint
and an assumed mechanism ofaction. An
advantage of this approach is that it re-
stores priority for chemicals that may not
be carcinogenic but that are highly toxic to
the reproductive or nervous systems.
Arguably, these types of chemical risks
have been overlooked in the United States
in the past decade (39). However, this
approach does not reduce the problems of
determining levels (no effect or lowest
observed effect) to which to apply safety or
uncertainty factors (40).
Third, we could use novel tools of risk
reduction that avoid or reduce the burden
ofsetting point estimates for standards and
guidelines. The approach embodied in
California's Proposition 65, largely written
by EDF, sidesteps the entanglements of
full risk assessment as the path to reaching
decisions. Risk assessment is used to trig-
ger disclosure provisions, rather than to
specify control actions. Under Proposition
65, industries and other sources must dis-
close to the public when they release or
otherwise expose people to chemicals
known to cause cancer or reproductive tox-
icity in humans or animals. The require-
ment of disclosure is different from an
overt, enforceable requirement to bring
these exposures down to specific levels
below which a defined increase in risk is
estimated to occur. A recent review of
implementation of Proposition 65 by
California state government concluded
that it is an efficient and productive mech-
anism for risk reduction (S.A. Book, testi-
mony before the Senate Committee on
Government Affairs, 27 March 1992).
Several examples ofproduct reformulation
to avoid disclosure have already occurred.
A similar approach operates through
the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) in the
United States, a program ofdata reporting
and publication by EPA pursuant to the
Superfund amendments. TRI requires
industrial sources to report annually to
EPA their releases of toxic chemicals into
air, water, and land disposal. This report-
ing provision has elicited voluntary risk
reduction measures in the absence of risk
assessments on a chemical-by-chemical or
release-by-release basis. Because of indus-
try's positive reaction to disclosures, EPA
has established the 33/50 initiative to
reduce releases ofhigh-priority toxic chem-
icals by 50% from 1990 to 1995 (41).
The success of this program is due to two
factors: the disclosure provisions of the
TRI program are mandatory and accessible
to computer-literate citizens, and most
releases are generated by a small and iden-
tifiable segment of industry. About 10%
of reporting facilities release more than
75% of the high-priority toxic chemicals
(41). If the goal of halving these releases
within 5 years can be accomplished with-
out chemical- or process-specific regula-
tions, then the need for quantitative risk
assessments will be greatly reduced. It
remains to be seen the extent to which
such innovative approaches can be used in
other arenas ofrisk reduction.
Conclusions. The rise of risk assess-
ment in the United States in the late 1970s
was supported and encouraged by many
environmentalists. However, in practice,
risk assessment has expedited regulatory
actions to reduce risks, and public accep-
tance of the increasingly complex tech-
niques of quantifying risk has diminished
over the past decade. A review of the
paralysis of EPA in regard to TCDD
exemplifies the scientific and political
problems with risk assessment. In addi-
tion, the exclusive focus of risk assessment
on cancer has probably resulted in lost
opportunities to reduce human exposure to
other types of toxic substances and, by
implication, the incidence of noncancer
disease and disability.
Alternatives to risk assessment include
a return to either technology-based or pure
risk approaches, where quantification of
risk is not necessary. The new Clean Air
Act of 1990 to some extent exchanges the
pure-risk approach for technology-based
regulation, with more specific language to
require development and application of
advanced technology. Although no politi-
cal consensus has yet been reached to
repeal the remaining pure-risk provisions
of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act as
they affect pesticides and other food addi-
tives, it seems unlikely that extending the
pure-risk strategy to other industrial chem-
icals would be politically acceptable.
Portney (7) and others have discussed the
political liabilities of promising "absolutist
goals" in environmental policy.
Another alternative is the use of risk
assessment as a semiquantitative signal for
action, using disclosure to stimulate action
without specifying the precise standard to
be reached. This approach has in some
cases resulted in relatively rapid response
by industry to avoid disclosure, but the
impact ofinformation is ultimately limited
in its efficacy to change human behavior
(42). There may be cases where semivol-
untary actions will not reduce risks to the
level deemed acceptable. For instance,
attempts to reduce smoking through edu-
cation may have reached their plateau of
efficacy in the United States. Nevertheless,
this approach is preferable to handing over
regulatory decision making to a technolog-
ical elite, whose members alone can under-
stand the increasingly arcane basis and data
analysis of quantitative risk assessment
(15,16,33). Environmentalists today, as in
the past, accept the challenge ofintegrating
public health goals into broader commit-
ments to a just and workable democratic
society.
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